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Justice William J. Brennan Jr.

A Justice
for All
Seasons
By Joel M. Gora
J. Brennan Jr. celebrates two
milestones this year: his 80th birthday
and his 30th anniversary as an associate
justice of the Supreme Court. The latter
occasion will place him in a select circle;
in this century only Hugo L. Black and
William 0. Douglas have served as long.
His tenure has encompassed seven presidencies, and his hundreds of opinions
span 120 volumes of the U.S. Reports.
His three decades on the Court have
witnessed turbulent changes in the nation
and the world. The Court itself has experienced both the extraordinary developments of doctrine associated with the
Warren Court and the major retrenchments identified with the Burger Court.
On the Warren Court, Brennan was at
the center of innovation; under the regime of Chief Justice Burger, Brennan is
a prominent dissenter, Writing more
often for history than for the Court.
No one could have foreseen this development in 1956, when President Eisenhower, adhering to a policy of appointing
distinguished and moderate appellate
court judges, but not unmindful of the
electoral advantages, named Justice
Brennan-a Northern, urban, Irish
Catholic Democrat-to the Supreme
Court. Raised in Newark, N.J., as one of
eight children of a self-made, wellrespected public official, Brennan was an
honors graduate of the University of
Pennsylvania and of Harvard Law
School. After graduation in 1931, he
joined a prominent Newark law firm and
specialized in the emerging field of labor
law.
Following wartime military service as a
manpower troubleshooter and negotiator, Brennan returned to law practice in
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Newark and became involved in drafting
major changes in the New Jersey judiciary as part of a new state constitution.
Decades later, he would play a major role
in urging the use of state constitutions as
an additional source of protection for
individual rights. In 1949, he was appointed to the state trial court and, in
rapid succession, to the appellate court
and in 1952 to the New Jersey Supreme
Court, a collegial tribunal where Brennan developed the consensus-building
skills that would characterize much of his
work on the Supreme Court.
The Court that Justice Brennan joined
had no clear direction or identity. The
school desegregation decisions had not
yet been implemented, and concepts like
affirmative action had not even been articulated. First Amendment doctrine was
mostly a function of ad hoc decisionmaking as the Court grappled with the
issues posed by Communist Party advocacy and association. The rights of the
accused, too, were determined by caseby-case adjudication, and the major reforms that would protect defendants
against the excesses of local law enforcement were years away.
Notions of using the Constitution to
protect private choice on intimate matters such as contraception, abortion and
sexual privacy or preference would have
seemed visionary. Problems raised by
grossly malapportioned state legislatures
were viewed as political questions not
subject to constitutional measure. Indeed, constitutional restraints seemed
largely irrelevant to the conduct of government at the state and local levels.
Through a blend of pragmatism and
principle, with an ebullient, gregarious
and easy personal manner, Justice Brennan helped change all that.
Landmark opinions
Within a decade, Justice Brennan
would write for the Court such landmark
opinions as NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415 (1963), which recognized public interest litigation as a valid form of political
advocacy; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963), which prevented governments
from penalizing religious freedom by
withholding benefits from religious observers; Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963),
the case that dramatically expanded the
scope of federal habeas corpus review of
state criminal convictions; New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964), which protected citizen-critics of

public officials from punitive defamation
suits and in the process effected major
reforms in First Amendment doctrine
and perception; and Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186 (1962), which held that challenges to malapportionment were constitutionally justiciable under the equal protection clause and changed the face of
American politics for all time.
The aggregate impact of Button, Sullivan and Baker has been to make possible
the major issue movements of the past 20
years-civil rights, equal rights, environmental protection, consumer protection
and the anti-war movement by safeguarding legal and citizen advocacy of
causes and ensuring responsive legislatures. Justice Brennan also would play a
major role in making the protections of
the Bill of Rights available to criminal
defendants in state and local proceedings.
Having had that impact would be career enough for most justices. But in
Justice Brennan's case, it was only the tip
of the iceberg.
He has fashioned concepts and developed doctrines that have become part of
the very vocabulary of constitutional law.
In the First Amendment area, the concerns that freedom of expression needs
"breathing space" and that laws regulating speech must not produce the chilling
effect of self-censorship were articulated
by Justice Brennan.
In the famed Pentagon Papers case,
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713 (1971), the only common
ground that united six justices in the
short per curiam decision that lifted the
injunctions against the press was a principle stated by Justice Brennan a decade
earlier: "Any system of prior restraints of
expression comes to this Court bearing a
heavy presumption against itsconstitutional validity." Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
The "right-privilege" distinctionpopularized by one of Justice Holmes'
more famous epigrams ("the petitioner
may have a constitutional right to talk
politics, but he has no constitutional right
to be a policeman") was rejected in a
series of opinions by Justice Brennan in
which he observed: "Itistoo late inthe
day to doubt that the liberties of religion
and expression may be infringed by denial of or placing of conditions upon a
benefit or privilege." This concept also
would play an important role in affording
due process protections to recipients of
social welfare benefits.
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Justice Brennan's refusal in the 1963
Button case to allow the use of "mere
labels," such as "solicitation" of legal
business, to place speech outside the pale
of First Amendment protection played a
vital role in later cases extending'that
protection in cases of defamation, offensive remarks and commercial speech.
His 1966 ruling that Congress possessed the power to expand, but not
restrict, the meaning of equal protection
under the 14th Amendment, Katzenbach
v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, drew much
academic criticism. This theory was quietly reaffirmed by the Court in a 1982
opinion written by Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor. Mississippi University for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718.
Justice Brennan's protection of personal choice regarding contraception in a
1972 case, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, played an important role a year later
in Justice Harry Blackmun's landmark
abortion decision in Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973).
Robust debate
Lastly, his analysis of the core purposes
of the First Amendment in the 1964
Sullivan decision, identifying the "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,"
coupled with his observation a year later
that "speech concerning public affairs is
more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government," have informed a generation about the central
meaning of freedom of expression in a
democratic society.
During the early Warren years, Justice
Brennan's opinions usually sought the
narrow ground in order to achieve a
majority. During the heyday of the Warren era, from 1962 to 1969, he was the
"playmaker" for the Court, fashioning
agreement on the broader statements of
constitutional principle associated with
that period. But even then, Justice Brennan frequently steered a pragmatic path
between ad hoc resolution and absolutist doctrine-the Sullivan case, for
example, afforded the press extensive
protection from defamation suits, but not
the absolute immunity that Justices Black
and Douglas urged.
In the years since then, Justice Brennan's role has changed markedly. Though
on occasion he still orchestrates important rulings, he is more often in dissent,
frequently chiding the Court for its departure from Warren Court rulings and
occasionally questioning the majority's
good faith-particularly in the many
cases in which Justice Rehnquist au20
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thored the Court's ruling.
He serves now as the Court's conscience, the keeper of the flame, pointing
to the more enduring constitutional principles that the Court's decisions too often
denigrate or ignore.
But Justice Brennan has not been unfailingly liberal. In his 1957 opinion in
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, he
ruled that obscenity, narrowly defined,
was not part of "the freedom of speech,"
a position he altered years later, too late
for a more normal First Amendment
approach. Justice Brennan's 1966 ruling
in the Ralph Ginzburg case, (Ginzburg v.
United States, 383 U.S. 463), upholding
an obscenity conviction because of the
manner in which the materials were marketed, was, as one observer put it, "not
to his credit."
That same year, his decision that the
compulsory extraction of blood samples
from a suspected drunk driver did not
amount to "testimonial compulsion" and
thus was not barred by the privilege
against self-incrimination drew dissents
from the Court's liberal wing.
Throughout these periods, however,
there has been a remarkable consistency
to Brennan's views of constitutional principles. The guiding vision he consistently
invokes is "the constitutional ideal of
libertarian dignity protected through
law." The principles that inform this vision are manifest in his jurisprudence.
Individual autonomy
First is a commitment to individual
autonomy and privacy. He has been a
vigorous champion of Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable search
and seizure and of the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination,
which together create "nothing less than
a comprehensive right of personal liberty
in the face of governmental intrusion."
Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427
(1963)(dissent). Accordingly, he has bitterly opposed the recent erosion of the
Fourth Amendment-based exclusionary
rule and of the protections associated
with the Miranda decision.
Concern for individual autonomy also
can be seen in Justice Brennan's opinions
in the areas of sexual freedom, family

planning and the right of intimate association, which reflect his appreciation of a
domain of personal choice, a sanctuary
free from official coercion or compulsion.
Finally, Justice Brennan's development
of First Amendment barriers to selfcensorship reflects a similar sense that
individuals must be left free to engage in
speech and association.
Equality is another component of libertarian dignity, and Justice Brennan has
been a vigorous advocate of eliminating
all forms of second-class citizenship. He
has written key decisions in the area of
school desegregation that provide the
lower courts with effective remedial
tools. He has written movingly against
laws that discriminate against minorities
by imposing a majority's views of appropriate family living arrangements and
uses of language. Justice Brennan has
been in the forefront of judicial efforts to
secure constitutional equality for women.
His 1973 opinion holding that gender
classifications were, like race and national origin, suspect and subject to strict
scrutiny fell one vote short of commanding a majority of the Court. Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677. Three years
later, he fashioned a consensus on the
slightly less demanding standard of review for gender-based distinctions that
the: Court has employed ever since to
invalidate most such laws. Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190. In a tour de force in
1982, Justice Brennan persuaded a majority to join him in holding that laws that
deprive illegal alien children of a free
public education help to perpetuate a
permanent underclass and are inconsistent with our principles of equality under
law. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202. And, of
course, his reapportionment decision in
Baker v. Carrmade a critical contribution
to the goal of equal political rights.
Human dignity is another foundation
of Justice Brennan's vision. He has insisted that laws allocating social welfare benefits comport with the requirements of
due process and equal protection. Employing principles of equal treatment, he
wrote for the Court in 1969 that since
such laws condition "the ability of the
families to obtain the very means to
subsist-food, shelter, and other necessities of life," a one-year residency waiting
period, which both deprived people of
necessities and hampered their ability to
move into the community, would be subject to strict constitutional scrutiny. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618.
A year later, in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, he persuaded the Court that
individuals claiming a statutory entitlement to welfare assistance were entitled

by due process to a hearing before a
decision could be reached that they no
longer were eligible for benefits, a principle that was quickly applied to other
government largesse and licenses. While
these decisions have been buffeted considerably by later Burger Court rulings,
their sense of decency and dignity survives.
His concern for human dignity also has
caused Justice Brennan to dissent in all
cases involving the imposition of the
death penalty. As he recently put it: "The
calculated killing of a human being by the
State involves, by its very nature, an
absolute denial of the executed person's
humanity. The most vile murder does
not, in my view, release the State from
constitutional restraints on the destruction of human dignity."
Official accountability
But one pervasive theme informs Justice Brennan's vision of libertarian digni-ty: the concept of official accountability.
This theme may be his most enduring
contribution to constitutional law. It
takes three basic forms: procedural, judicial and political.
Procedural accountability is designed
to ensure a first line of defense against
arbitrary official actions. Reflecting the
former trial lawyer's appreciation of the
role of procedural safeguards in protecting substantive rights, this theme can be
seen in much of Justice Brennan's work:
insisting in the First Amendment area on
placing the burden of proof on the censor
and not the speaker; requiring fair procedures before government benefits may be
withheld or withdrawn from a presumably entitled beneficiary; in criminal law,
articulating the need for having lawyers
present at lineups, for requiring Miranda
warnings, and for an independent magistrate to safeguard Fourth Amendment
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.
In the Leon case in 1984, Justice Brennan bitterly dissented when the Court
held that the police might reasonably rely
on a defective warrant simply because a
magistrate issued it. United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897. Very recently, the
Court declined review in a case where a
magistrate had issued an arguably defective warrant simply because the police
requested one. Justice Brennan summarized the operation of the two rules: "The
combined message of Leon and the
Court's refusal to grant certiorari in this
case is that the police may rely on the
magistrates and the magistrates may rely
on the police. On whom may the citizens
rely to protect their Fourth Amendment

rights?" McCommon v.Mississippi, 106
S. Ct. 393 (1985).
Justice Brennan also seeks official accountability through vigorous judicial review. He has been a champion of increased access to the federal courts and
the primary Court advocate of an expansive interpretation of state constitutions
by state courts.
Linking the two approaches is his view
that "one of the strengths of our federal
system is that it provides a double source
of protection for the rights of our citizens." Thus, he dramatically broadened
the range of federal habeas corpus review
of state criminal convictions because the
Great Writ's "root principle is that in a
civilized society, government must always
be accountable to the judiciary for a
man's imprisonment." Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391 (1963).
Justice Brennan has been the principal
author of a number of key decisions vitalizing the statutory cause of action to
redress violations of federal rights by
state and local officials, and it was his
ruling that fashioned a constitutional
cause of action for damages against federal officials who violate citizens' rights.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
In recent years he has vehemently protested the federal courts' excessive use of
abstention, standing and other "doorclosing" devices because he views those
courts as the "primaryand powerful reliances for vindicating" federal rights.
Hallmarks of democracy
But perhaps Justice Brennan's most
important contribution has been to foster
the principles of political accountability.
Democracy turns not so much on government's accountability to the courts, but to
In October, Justice Brennan will have
spent 30 years on the Supreme Court.
He turned 80 in April.. His wife, Mary,
worked for the Court for 40 years.

the people. His decisions have played a
central role in expanding uninhibited discussion of public matters and in ensuring
equal participation
in political
determinations-the dual hallmarks of a
democratic society.
Justice Brennan's career on the Court
compels consideration of one final issue
of accountability, which is the perpetual
paradox of judicial review in a democracy: to whom shall the judges be accountable? There are, to be sure, many constraints on the Court-constitutional,
institutional, precedential and professional-but these mark the outer
boundaries of judicial power. In the main
the justices are unfettered in their interpretation of the Constitution's text and
principles. This phenomenon has intrigued scholars, cautioned judges and occasionally, as now, angered political leaders into calls for "strict construction."
Recently, these issues have been raised
by Attorney General Edwin Meese, who,
in a widely publicized speech to the
American Bar Association's annual
meeting last year, criticized a number of
Court rulings as "more policy choices
than articulations of constitutional principle" and urged, instead, a "jurisprudence
of original intention." Several weeks
later, Justice Brennan took the unusual
step of commenting on such views at a
law school symposium:
"We current Justices read the Constitution in the only way that we can: as
20th century Americans. We look to the
history of the time of framing and to the
intervening history of interpretation. But
the ultimate question must be, what do
the words of the text mean in our time.
For the genius of the Constitution rests
not in any static meaning it might have
had in a world that is dead and gone, but
in the adaptability of its great principles
to cope with current problems and current needs. What the constitutional fundamentals meant to the wisdom of othertimes cannot be their measure to the
vision of our time."
The democratic leap of faith that the
paradox of judicial review requires, in
entrusting to the justices of the Court the
articulation 'of constitutional principles,
has been amply vindicated in the case of
Justice Brennan. His colleague and
friend, Chief Justice Warren, remarked
20 years ago that Justice Brennan "administers the Constitution as a sacred
trust." Through the many changes in the
Court that his tenure has encompassed,
Justice Brennan has remained remarkably faithful to that trust.
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